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AIR TRANSPORTATION TAXATION: THE CASE
FOR REFORM
CHARLES E. SMITH*
T HE U.S. AIRLINE industry no longer receives the public es-teem it once enjoyed.' Although air carriers share the
blame for some of the battering their reputations have received,
they cannot be faulted for the litany of government-imposed
user fees and taxes that irk many passengers. Currently, the fed-
eral government permits various agencies to levy nine disparate
taxes and user fees on air travelers.2 These charges can add
more than $75 to a roundtrip domestic journey.3 On interna-
tional trips, which are also subject to foreign governments' taxes
and fees, the amount added to the base fare can soar to over
$350.4 What can be done to rein in these charges?
This article examines the taxes and user fees added by the
U.S. government to airline tickets for travel to, from, and within
the United States. First, the article considers the roots of these
various charges. Second, it outlines the current tax schedule.
Third, it highlights the faults of one particular fee as an exam-
ple of how the current regulatory scheme disserves both air car-
riers and the flying public. Fourth, it looks at mechanisms for
* Charles E. Smith is an associate at King & Spalding in Washington, D.C.
This article was originally written as a paper for the Cross-Border Commercial
Regulation Seminar taught by Warren Dean and Allan Mendelsohn at
Georgetown University Law Center. In addition, the author is grateful to Mary
Barnicle, Cecilia Bethke, Jeffrey Manley, and Annalei Avancefia for their
invaluable assistance and support.
1 See, e.g., Roger Yu, Airlines Score Lower than IRS in Customer Satisfaction, USA
TODAY, May 15, 2007, at 5B (noting that according to the University of Michigan's
American Customer Satisfaction Index, the airline industry scored 63 out of 100,
while the Internal Revenue Service scored 65).
2 See Appendix for a complete breakdown of U.S. air transportation taxes.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Taxes and Fees, DELTA, http://www.delta.com/planning reserva-
tions/plan-flight/onlinereservations/faresticketing_rules/taxesifees/index.
jsp (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (noting that foreign fees and taxes may total up to
$299).
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ameliorating the situation. Possible solutions include the en-
forcement of provisions in the Chicago Convention and bilat-
eral air service agreements, as well as the implementation of
numerous recommendations repeatedly made by the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO).
I. AVIATION IS AN EASY TARGET FOR TAXATION
In the United States, the taxation of airline tickets began with
the Revenue Act of 1941.6 Since then federal taxes on aviation
have spiraled out of control. According to Joseph Leonard, for-
mer AirTran chief executive officer, airline passengers pay the
highest rate of federal taxation-even higher than consumers of
liquor and cigarettes.6
Taxation of air transportation has rapidly increased mainly
because it is a soft target.7 First, these charges are easy to col-
lect, in part because only a handful of companies need remit
them.8 Second, the voting public is not cognizant of the
amount of taxes it pays when traveling by air, particularly since
many of those charges must be included in the advertised ticket
price.9 Voters thus have little incentive to complain to politi-
cians, even when taxes add as much as 20% to a domestic
ticket."o Moreover, airline passengers lack a general advocate.
The only group lobbying on behalf of airline passengers has
thus far limited its efforts to the passage of an airline passenger
5 KENNETH J. BUTTON, THE TAXATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION, app. A (2005),
http://www.gmupolicy.net/transport2003/airlinetaxation.pdf.
6 Anthony Ryan, How Airline Security Fees in a Post September 11, 2001 Environment
Are Spiraling Out of Control, 29 TRANsp. L.J. 253, 260 (2002) (citing AirTran Air-
ways: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp.
and Infrastructure (Sept. 24, 2002)).
7 See BUrrON, supra note 5, at 7.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Government-Imposed Taxes/Fees on Commercial Air Travel, AIR TRANsp. Ass'N,
http://www.airlines.org/Economics/Taxes/Pages/GovTaxesandFeesonAirline-
Travel.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). Compare air transportation with financial
transactions, which are a "hard target" because taxes on bank deposits and with-
drawals are immediately seen by consumers and must be remitted by hundreds or
thousands of companies. As a result, financial transaction taxes rarely meet with
success. See, e.g., Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Tax-Happy Brazil Hits the Wall, WALL ST.
J., Jan 28, 2008, at A14 (discussing the end of Brazil's national financial transac-
tions tax); Press Release, Australian Bankers' Ass'n, 30-Day Countdown Until
Bank Tax Abolished (May 31, 2001), available at http://www.bankers.asn.au/de-




bill of rights." It remains to be seen if the passage of such legis-
lation will prod the group to expand its goals to include lobby-
ing against excessive taxes and fees. These factors have resulted
in a plethora of government charges levied on air
transportation.
In some instances, airlines have successfully challenged the le-
gality of a tax or fee.12 For example, in 1970, the Evansville-
Vanderburgh Airport Authority enacted an ordinance mandat-
ing that airlines collect and remit, less administrative costs, a
one-dollar fee per passenger." The fee would go into a fund
dedicated to paying for "the construction, improvement, equip-
ment, and maintenance of [the] Airport and its facilities for the
continued use and future enjoyment by all users thereof.""
Delta Air Lines (Delta) and other carriers claimed that the fee
violated the Commerce Clause by constituting an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce.1 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed." The majority upheld airport-imposed passenger
charges "so long as the toll [was] based on some fair approxima-
tion of use or privilege for use ... and [was] neither discrimina-
tory against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison
with the governmental benefit conferred.""
Although the airlines lost their court battle over airport-im-
posed passenger charges, they ultimately succeeded in the legis-
lative arena. In response to the ruling in Evansville, Congress
enacted section seven of the Airport Development Acceleration
Act of 1973, commonly referred to as the Anti-Head Tax Act.18
The Anti-Head Tax Act prohibits states, including subdivisions
like airport authorities, from levying or collecting "a tax, fee,
head charge, or other charge" on: (1) an individual traveling in
air commerce; (2) the transportation of an individual traveling
in air commerce; (3) the sale of air transportation; or (4) the
11 While the Coalition for an Airline Passengers Bill of Rights recently changed
its name to Flyers Rights, it did not expand its agenda. About Us, FLYERS RIGHTS,
http://flyersrights.org/about/php (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
12 See, e.g., Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
405 U.S. 707, 709 (1972); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., 463
P.2d 470, 472 (Mont. 1970).
13 Evansville, 405 U.S. at 709.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 721-22.
17 Id. at 716-17.
1s Pub. L. No. 93-44, 87 Stat. 90 (1973) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40116(b)
(2006)).
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gross receipts from that air commerce or transportation. 9 Con-
gress, embracing the arguments espoused by Delta, passed this
law because it feared that the Evansville holding might lead to a
proliferation of local taxes on airline passengers.2 o Thus, air-
lines have proven successful in preventing states and airport au-
thorities from adding to the existing federal aviation taxation
scheme.21
Although beyond the scope of this article, the taxes and fees
levied by foreign governments are similarly high. Some coun-
tries levy a form of "departure tax" imposed on all passengers
departing the country.22 For example, the United Kingdom le-
vies an Air Passenger Duty of up to 80 GBP per passenger,2 and
Brazil levies a Departure Tariff of up to U.S. $36 per passen-
ger.2 4 Others have followed the U.S. model of imposing a vari-
ety of taxes and fees for various purposes.2 5 For example, airline
tickets purchased in Canada are subject to four separate taxes
and fees. 2 6 First, Canada imposes a NAV Canada Surcharge of
CAD $7.50 to $20 one-way, based on the distance flown, to pay
for air traffic control services.2 7 Second, Canada collects an Air
Travellers Security Charge of CAD $5 to $8 one-way to pay for
19 Id. § 113.
20 S. REP. No. 93-12, at 4 (1973) (describing Congress's intent to "ensure ...
that local 'head' taxes will not be permitted to inhibit the flow of interstate com-
merce"); id. at 13 ("The head tax . . . cuts against the grain of the traditional
American right to travel among the States ... ."); H.R. REP. No. 93-157, at 4-5
(1973).
21 Airlines continue to pay user fees to airport authorities. Such fees are rea-
sonable if based on a fair approximation of use of airport facilities, not excessive
in relation to the benefits conferred, and not discriminatory against interstate
commerce. Nw. Airlines v. County of Kent, Mich. 510 U.S. 355, 369 (1994). Per
an amendment to the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994,
the Secretary of Transportation now possesses the authority to determine reason-
ableness. 49 U.S.C. § 47129(a) (1) (2006). Airport fees, of course, may ultimately
be passed on to consumers in the form of higher fares, but because they are
levied not on passengers but instead on airlines, they are beyond the scope of this
article.
22 See, e.g., Air Passenger Duty, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.
uk/air-passenger-duty/index.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
28 Id.
24 Portaria No. 955/DGAC, de 15 de Dezembro de 1997, DIAuo OFFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 17.12.1997 (Brazil).




27 Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialization Act, S.C. 1996, c. 20 (Can.).
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security costs. 28 Third, Canada's Goods and Services Tax (GST)
applies to the price of airline tickets purchased in Canada.2 9 Fi-
nally, airports at which a passenger embarks or connects are per-
mitted to impose an Airport Improvement Fee of up to CAD
$40.30 The International Air Transport Association (IATA) pub-
lishes a list of taxes and fees imposed worldwide, updated
quarterly.3
Recently, a group of developing countries led by the Maldives
began lobbying for a global aviation tax to pay for projects to
slow climate change in the developing world.3 2 The so-called
International Air Passenger Adaptation Levy would add $6 to
$62 to the cost of international airline tickets.13  Should that
multilateral tax proposal gain traction, it could set a precedent
for a future wave of new taxes on international aviation levied
not by individual states but by multilateral organizations or small
groups of states.
II. THE CURRENT TAX SCHEME IS OVERWHELMING
Even casting aside fees levied by foreign governments, deci-
phering the taxes and user fees levied on air transportation by
the U.S. government is a daunting task." As many as nine gov-
ernment-imposed charges are listed on passenger receipts. 5
This section details the various taxes and user fees, including
their statutory bases and purposes.
28 Air Travellers Security Charge Act, S.C. 2002, c. 9 (Can.).
29 See generally How GST/HST Works, CAN. REVENUE AGENCY, http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/tx/bsnss/tpcs/gst-tps/gnrl/hw-eng.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
30 Travellers to Pay More for Departure Taxes at Canadian Airports, CBC NEWS (Oct.
5, 2007), http://www.cbc.ca/consumer/story/2007/10/05/departure-
taxes.html.
31 IATA List of Ticket and Airport Taxes and Fees, IATA, http://www.iata.org/ps/
financialservices/pages/tax-list.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (IATA charges
$1,500 for the list).
32 Other News-11/03/2009, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD DAILY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2009),
http://atwonline.com/aeropolitics-regulation/news/other-news-1 1032009-0309.
33 Id.
34 The task is further complicated by the industry practice of assigning two-
letter codes to identify the various charges, thus making it difficult for passengers
to distinguish between fees added by air carriers and those assessed by
governments.
3 See Appendix for a complete breakdown of U.S. air transportation taxes.
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A. PASSENGER FACILITY CHARGES
Only one of the taxes or government fees collected by airlines
is not destined for federal coffers" 6-Passenger Facility Charges
(PFC) are remitted to airports. Any U.S. airport may submit
an application to the Department of Transportation (DOT) re-
questing the authority to impose a PFC on passengers who
board a flight at that airport.38 DOT may then grant the author-
ity to impose a PFC ranging from $1.00 to $4.50 per passenger."
Should the passenger make multiple stops during the same itin-
erary, only the first two airports may collect a PFC.4 0 Only pas-
sengers on flights within Hawaii or Alaska on aircraft carrying
fewer than sixty passengers and non-revenue passengers are ex-
empt.4 1 As of August 2010, ninety-eight of the busiest one hun-
dred airports charged the maximum $4.50 PFC.4 2 Total
collections have remained above an astounding $2.5 billion
since 2006.11
In order for DOT to approve an airport's request to impose a
PFC, the airport's project must fit the statutory definition of an
"eligible airport-related project."44 This definition includes air-
port development and planning, terminal development, airport
noise capability planning, noise compatibility measures, passen-
6 In contrast to many other countries, most U.S. airports are owned and oper-
ated by local governments. See generally 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 88 (2010).
3 49 U.S.C. § 40117(i), (j) (2006). Section 40117(j) reiterates that states and
their political subdivisions may not levy any charge apart from a DOT-approved
PFC on airline passengers embarking or disembarking within their jurisdiction.
38 Id. § 40117(c).
3 Id. § 40117(b). The American Association of Airport Executives has pro-
posed increasing the maximum fee and then allowing automatic adjustments for
inflation. Roger Yu, Airports Want Passenger Fee Charge Increased, USA TODAY, Nov.
30, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2009-11-30-
airwar30_ST N.htm. Airlines have opposed any increase. See, e.g., Letter from
James May, Chief Executive Officer, ATA, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives and John A. Boehner, Minority Leader of the U.S.
House of Representatives (May 18, 2009), available at http://airlines.org/pub-
licpolicy/ATAletters/pages/letter 518_09.aspx.
4o 49 U.S.C. § 40117(e) (2) (A).
41 Id. § 40117(e) (2) (C)-(E). Non-revenue passengers include fliers traveling
on frequent flyer awards in addition to airline employees and their companions
traveling on a space-available basis or on airline business. See id.
§ 40117(e) (2) (C).
42 Passenger Facility Charges (PFC), AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, http://www.airlines.org/
Economics/Taxes/Pages/PassengerFacilityCharges(PFC).aspx (last visited Oct.
22, 2010).
43 Id.
- 49 U.S.C. § 40117(a) (3), (b) (4).
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ger terminal construction, conversion of ground support equip-
ment and airport vehicles to low-emission technology, and debt
service." Courts have held that DOT has significant leeway to
determine whether a project qualifies as an "eligible airport-re-
lated project."16 In fact, courts have recently upheld PFC financ-
ing of construction projects at off-airport locations, most notably
the construction of public transportation links between cities
and airports.4 7 Furthermore, DOT need not conduct a cost-ben-
efit analysis or apply any formal test or checklist before certify-
ing a project's eligibility for PFC funding." As a result of the
low standard for approving PFC requests, DOT has rejected only
five airport authorities' proposals."
B. EXCISE TAX, THE FEDERAL SEGMENT FEE, AND THE TRAVEL
FACILITIES FEE
The federal government levies an excise tax on domestic
flights.5 0 Flights to and from Canadian and Mexican cities less
than 225 miles from the U.S. border are also subject to the tax."
The tax rate has fluctuated over the years.52 Since 1999, how-
ever, this tax has rested at 7.5% of the fare.53 The taxes col-
lected accrue to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which
provides grants to airports for planning-and-development pro-
ject costs (in addition to the amount airports receive from im-
posing a PFC) .5 The aviation excise tax as a percentage of total
45 Id. § 40117(b) (4), (d)(1)-(2).
46 See, e.g., Se. Queens Concerned Neighbors, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 229
F.3d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 2000).
47 Id. at 389, 396 (holding that DOT did not abuse its discretion in allowing
airports controlled by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to collect a
PFC in order to finance a light rail line connecting John F. Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport to the Jamaica Transit Station).
48 See id. at 393.
4 Passenger Facility Charges (PFC), supra note 42 (noting rejected proposals from
Austin, Texas; Naples, Florida; Orlando, Florida; Peoria, Illinois; and St. Augus-
tine, Florida).
50 26 U.S.C. § 4261(a) (2006).
51 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 added these itineraries to those subject to the
excise tax. Rev. Rul. 87-133 (1987), 1987-2 C.B. 261.
52 The tax rate has remained between five and ten percent since its inception.
See, e.g., Tax Rate Extension Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-75, § 4, 73 Stat. 157, 158
(1959) (reducing the tax from ten to five percent effective July 1, 1960); Pub. L.
No. 105-34, § 1031, 111 Stat. 929, 931-32 (1997) (establishing a three-year phase-
in period for the current rate).
53 26 U.S.C. § 4261 (a).
54 See ALEXANDER WELLS & SETH YOUNG, AIRPORT PLANNING & MANAGEMENT 18,
31, 216 (4th ed. 2000).
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federal excise tax receipts has skyrocketed from 3.3% in 1971 to
a peak of 14.4% in 1999.15 It has since settled at around 13% of
federal excise tax revenues."'
During the period of economic regulation of the airline in-
dustry, this tax had similar impacts on all U.S. carriers. The Air-
line Deregulation Act, signed into law in 1978, changed this
dynamic.5 7 Suddenly a host of low-cost carriers entered the mar-
ket." These airlines typically offered only one class of service
and fares lower than those of the legacy airlines.5 9 As a result of
their lower average fares, excise taxes collected by low-cost carri-
ers trailed the receipts of legacy carriers.6 0  Legacy carriers
claimed this resulted in their paying a disproportionate share of
the costs of running the national aviation system.6 ' Discount
carriers, notably Southwest Airlines, responded that the legacy
carriers' analysis was flawed because it ignored the fact that the
legacy carriers' hub-and-spoke networks required passengers to
make connections at hubs.6 2 Low-cost carriers, on the other
hand, generally operated point-to-point networks consisting pri-
marily of non-stop flights.6 3 Connecting flights created more of
a burden on the national air system than non-stops; thus, legacy
carriers should pay more of the costs associated with running
the national aviation system.6 4
To correct this imbalance, the legacy carriers argued for a
"user fee" based on the amount of miles flown and/or the num-
55 BurroN, supra note 5, at 7.
56 Id.
57 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 1, 92 Stat. 1705, 1705
(1978). The Civil Aeronautics Board, which had previously regulated where air-
lines could fly and what fares they could charge, ceased to exist on January 1,
1985. R. Dale Grinder, Departmental Historian, USDOT: A Brief History, http://
dotlibrary.dot.gov/Historian/history.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
58 See generally BARBARA PETERSON & JAMES GLAB, RAPID DESCENT: DEREGULA-
TION AND SHAKEOUT IN THE AIRLINES 12 (Simon & Schuster 1994); T.A. HEPPEN-
HEIMER, TURBULENT SKIES: THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION 319 (Wiley
1998).
59 See Tom NORWOOD, DEREGULATION KNOCKOUTS: ROUND ONE (Airways Int'l
1996) (cataloging carriers that ceased flying during the first decade of
deregulation).
60 Asra Q. Nomani, Major Airlines Push for New Ticket Tax, WALL ST. J., June 13,
1996, at A2.
61 The seven legacy carriers of the time claimed to account for 73% of com-
mercial air traffic while paying 82% of the taxes. Id.






ber of takeoffs and landings involved in an itinerary.65 Adding a
tax to each segment and mile flown, regardless of the fare,
would help close the gap between the percentage of excise taxes
collected by legacy carriers and the percentage of air traffic for
which they were responsible. 6
After an intense debate, Congress ultimately reached a com-
promise." By October 1999, the rate at which tickets were sub-ject to the excise tax was decreased to 7.5%, where it remains
today." At the same time, bowing to demands of the legacy car-
riers, Congress added a Federal Segment Fee. 69 For each seg-
ment, defined as "one takeoff and one landing, "o7 passengers
would be charged an additional $1.00.71 That amount would
increase according to a set schedule until reaching $3.00 per
segment in 2002.7 Adjusted annually for inflation, the Federal
Segment Fee increased to $3.70 in 2010.71
In addition, the government levies special segment fees on
flights from Alaska and Hawaii.7 4 The nebulously named Travel
Facilities Tax originally added $6 to each domestic flight seg-
ment departing from the nation's two newest states.7 5 This re-
places the $3.70 Federal Segment Fee for segments from Alaska
or Hawaii. 6 In 2010, the Travel Facilities Tax increased to
$8.10."
C. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION TAX
Instead of the Federal Segment Fee and Travel Facilities Tax,
international journeys beginning or ending in the United States
65 Id.
66 See Nomani, supra note 60.
67 Every major airline's chief executive officer attended the first House Ways
and Means Committee meeting on the subject, thousands of airline employees
signed petitions, and American Airlines went so far as to offer two free positive-
space tickets to Hawaii to any employee who participated in a rally at the Capi-
tol-over 1,000 did. Gregg Hitt, Airlines Taxi into Position Around Capitol Hill as
Lawmakers Make Decisions on Ticket Taxes, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1997, at A16.
68 26 U.S.C. § 4261(e) (5) (2006).
69 See id. § 4261 (b) (1).
70 Id. § 4261(b) (2).
71 Id. § 4261 (b) (1).
72 Id.
73 Rev. Proc. 2008-66 § 3.32, 2008-2 C.B. 1107 (I.R.S. Form 570).
74 26 U.S.C. § 4261 (c) (3).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Rev. Proc. 2008-66 § 3.32, 2008-2 C.B. 1107 (I.R.S. Form 570).
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are charged a flat tax of $16.10.78 The purpose of the Interna-
tional Transportation Tax is the same as that of the Federal Seg-
ment Fee and Travel Facilities Tax discussed above.
D. SEPTEMBER 11TH SECURITY FEE
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
the federal government overhauled aviation security. Cockpit
doors were reinforced.7 1 Minimum-wage contract employees
hired by the airlines to staff security checkpoints were replaced
with better-educated and higher-earning federal employees.80
Checked baggage began to receive the same scrutiny as carry-on
luggage.I Federal Air Marshals began to staff more flights.
These and other new security directives dramatically increased
the cost of keeping the national air system safe. For example,
new baggage screening requirements were projected to cost the
federal government $1.2 to $2.0 billion annually.8 4
The U.S. airlines' precarious financial position, and the simi-
lar woes felt by the country's airports, made it impossible for the
aviation industry to pay for the increased costs.8 5 As a result,
Congress passed legislation authorizing DOT to impose a uni-
78 26 U.S.C. § 4261 (c) (1); Rev. Proc. 2008-66 § 3.32, 2008-2 C.B. 1107 (I.R.S.
Form 570).
79 E.g., Eric Lichtblau, Security Report on U.S. Aviation Warns of Holes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2005, at Al.
80 E.g., Lizette Alvarez, Senate Votes to Federalize Job of Airport Screening, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at Bl.
81 E.g., Matthew Wald, Airport Managers Say Deadline for Screening All Checked Bags
Can't Be Met, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at A19.
82 E.g., Eric Lichtblau, Americans Order Foreign Airlines to Use Marshalls, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2003, at Al.
83 For example, security screeners employed by private firms earned minimum
wage while federalized screeners earn around $35,000 per year. Compare David
Firestone, Rules Will Allow Airport Screeners to Remain in Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2001, at Al, with David Firestone, Top Credentials Soughtfor Airport Security Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 18. Similarly, new machines to scan checked luggage,
which prior to September 11, 2001, was rarely searched, can cost more than $1
million each. Matthew Wald, Tough Issues on Baggage Screening Remain, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2002, at A15.
84 Alvarez, supra note 80.
85 Following the 9/11 attacks, the federal government established the Air
Transportation Stabilization Board to provide $5 billion in direct subsidies to
U.S. carriers as well as $10 billion in loan guarantees. Greg Hitt & Martha Bran-
nigan, Airline Bailout May Become Boon for U.S., WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2001, at A2.
For more on the Air Transportation Stabilization Board, see the Air Transporta-




form fee on all commercial air passengers." The new fee would
pay for nine specific security-related costs: (1) salaries for feder-
alized airport security screening personnel and their manag-
ers;8 1 (2) screening equipment and training;" (3) background
investigations of employees;89 (4) the Federal Air Marshal Pro-
gram; 0 (5) research and development of new aviation security
methods and equipment;9' (6) deployment of federal, state, and
local law enforcement officers at airports;92 (7) the Federal
Safety Managers Program; (8) security-related capital improve-
ment projects at airports;9 4 and (9) anti-terrorism training for
pilots and flight attendants. 9 5
Congress gave DOT and the Department of Homeland Secur-
ity (DHS) broad leeway to set a fee schedule as long as those
fees were "reasonably related to the Transportation Security Ad-
ministration's costs of providing services rendered."96 Congress
limited the Departments' discretion by placing an upper limit
on the September 11th Security Fee. Passengers face a maxi-
mum fee of $2.50 per enplanement at a U.S. airport but pay a
maximum of $5.00 per one-way trip, regardless of the number of
airports visited.
E. CUSTOMS USER FEE
In order to finance services provided at airports by the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), most international
passengers are charged a user fee." That fee has fluctuated
86 49 U.S.C. § 44940 (2006) (referring to the Security Service Fee, later
renamed the September 11th Security Fee). The Transportation Security Admin-
istration remained part of the Department of Transportation until the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security in 2002. Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 403, 116 Stat. 217-7, 217-8.
87 49 U.S.C. § 44940(a) (1) (A); see also id. § 44901.
88 Id. § 44940(a) (1) (B).
89 Id. § 44940(a) (1) (C).
90 Id. § 44940(a) (1) (D).
91 Id. § 44940(a) (1) (E).
92 Id. §§ 44940 (a) (1) (F), 44903.
93 Id. §§ 44940(a) (1) (G), 44903(h).
94 Id. § 44940(a) (1) (H).
95 Id. §§ 44940(a) (1) (I), 44918, 44921.
96 Id. § 44940(b).
97 Id. § 44940(c).
98 See 19 U.S.C. § 58c (2006). These inspections are "designed to prevent pas-
sengers from bringing illegal goods-such as narcotics-into the United States."
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1131, FEDERAL USER FEES: KEY As-
PECTS OF INTERNATIONAL AIR PASSENGER INSPECTION FEES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
9252010]
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over time but currently rests at $5.50 for passengers arriving
from countries other than Canada and Mexico.99 Currently,
CBP does not exercise its authority to levy a fee of up to $1.75
on passengers arriving from Canada, Mexico, and most Carib-
bean islands.100 Only Congress possesses the authority to
change fee levels; CBP may not issue its own regulations to
change the schedule.10 1 Airlines collect the user fees and remit
them quarterly to the Federal Treasury, which then reimburses
CBP for statutorily-allowed expenses. 0 2
The Customs User Fee is designed to ensure that customs ser-
vices are "adequately provided" to airline passengers. 0 An advi-
sory committee, consisting of representatives of airlines and
cruise lines subject to the user fee, meets periodically with CBP
representatives to discuss fee levels and performance.104 The
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee provide congressional oversight. 0 5
F. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION FEE
Similarly, DHS levies a fee to cover "the immigration inspec-
tion of each passenger arriving at a port of entry in the United
States, or for the preinspection of a passenger in a place outside
of the United States prior to such arrival, aboard a commercial
aircraft."10 6 Passengers who do not receive an inspection or
preinspection do not pay the fee.o'0 The current fee is $7.00 per
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER FEEs ARE CONSOLIDATED 9 (2007) [hereinafter GAO-07-
1131].
-9 From 1986 to 2005, the fee was $5.00, except for 1994 to 1997, when it was
$6.50. The current fee is in effect through 2014. GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at
13.
100 19 U.S.C. § 58 (b) (1) (A) (i) (I).
101 GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 13, tbl. 1.
102 Id. at 9.
103 19 U.S.C. § 58c(e).
104 Id. § 58c(k).
105 GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 13.
1o 8 U.S.C. § 1356(d) (2006). This inspection "is designed to prevent passen-
gers from entering the United States without legal entry and immigration docu-
ments." GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 9.
107 8 U.S.C. § 1356(e) (2). The primary beneficiaries of this exemption were
passengers participating in the Transit Without Visa and International-to-Interna-
tional programs. Both programs were suspended indefinitely in 2003. Suspen-




passenger. 0 8 Only Congress may adjust fee levels.109 Airlines
remit fees to the Federal Treasury quarterly, except in the
fourth quarter when receipts are due ten days before the end of
the fiscal year.110 The government then splits the receipts be-
tween CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
according to the costs incurred by each agency.111
The Immigration and Naturalization Fees collected by airlines
and cruise lines must only be used to fund the immigration in-
spections of airline and cruise line passengers; they may not be
used for inspections performed at land crossings.1 2 As with the
Customs User Fee, an advisory committee, consisting of airline
and cruise line representatives whose passengers are subject to
the user fee, meets periodically with DHS representatives to dis-
cuss fee levels and performance.' 1 3 The Judiciary and Home-
land Security Committees of both houses, the House Ways and
Means Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee provide
congressional oversight." 4
G. ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE FEE
Finally, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) of the Department of Agriculture (USDA) has the stat-
utory authority to collect a user fee for agricultural inspections
of international air passengers upon their arrival into the
United States." Unlike the Customs and Immigration user
fees, whose schedules are set by statute, the Secretary of Agricul-
ture retains discretion to set the APHIS Fee schedule. 1 6 The
APHIS Fee is levied on all international passengers, as well as
passengers moving between U.S. territories, Alaska, or Hawaii
and the continental United States, with the exception of passen-
gers moving between the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.'
os 8 U.S.C. § 1356(d). The fee was $5.00 from 1987 to 1993, when it was
raised to $6.00; the last increase occurred in 2002. GAO-07-1131, supra note 98,
at 14, tbl. 1.
1o GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 14, tbl. 1.
11o Id. at 9.
I Id.
112 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1356(g), (q).
n1 Id. § 1356(k).
114 GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 14, tbl. 1.
11 See 21 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1) (2006). These inspections are designed "to seize
prohibited materials and intercept foreign agricultural pests." GAO-07-1131,
supra note 98, at 10.
116 GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 10.
117 Id. at 21, tbl. 3.
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On October 1, 2009, pursuant to an interim rule, APHIS in-
creased its fee to $5.50 per passenger." That plan was subse-
quently delayed until November 1, 2009.11 On October 30,
2009, APHIS withdrew its interim rule "based on feedback and
comments from stakeholders."o2 0  Thus, APHIS currently
charges each passenger $5.00.12' Nevertheless, APHIS has stated
its intention to explore "regulatory alternatives" to increasing
that charge.' 2 2
No stakeholder advisory committee oversees the APHIS Fee;
APHIS does not solicit industry feedback on fee levels or per-
formance.123 The Agriculture Committees of both houses, the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee, provide congressional oversight.12 4
As will be discussed in the next section, each of these charges
has raised the ire of the airline industry, but air carriers have
particularly faulted the APHIS Fee. The 2009 proposed APHIS
Fee increase exemplifies many of the problems with the current
air transportation taxation scheme.
III. RECENT APHIS FEE INCREASE SYMBOLIZES THE
PROBLEMS OF THE CURRENT TAX SCHEME
On September 28, 2009, the USDA published an interim rule
and request for comments in the Federal Register announcing
its intention to change the regulations governing APHIS Fees
for international services.125 The fee for inspecting most passen-
118 User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed. Reg.
49,311, 49,315 (Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354).
119 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., User Fee Increases for Certain Commer-
cial Vehicles and International Air Passengers Delayed (Sept. 30, 2009), available
at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2009/09/adjfees.shtml; see
also User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed. Reg.
50,915, 50,915 (Oct. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354).
120 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA Withdraws Interim Rule for In-
creasing User Fees for Certain Commercial Vehicles and International Air Pas-
sengers (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/
content/2009/10/withdraw userfees.shtml; see also User Fees for Agricultural
Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,057, 57,057 (Nov. 4, 2009)
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354).
121 7 C.F.R. § 354.3(f) (2010).
122 User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 57,057.
123 GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 22-23.
124 Id. at 14, tbl. 1.
125 User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed. Reg.
49,311, 49,311 (Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354).
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gers arriving from abroad would increase from $5.00 to $5.50,
effective October 1, 2009.126 Although the increase may seem
minimal, the circumstances surrounding the change raised sig-
nificant concerns.1 2 7 Stakeholders were not given a chance to
give meaningful comment, nor did the USDA demonstrate ade-
quate evidence showing that fees were commensurate with the
costs of providing inspection services.1 2 1
A. THE USDA SHUNNED STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS
Timely notice of proposed changes in fee schedules, or other
agency rules, is essential. First, a delay between a rule's an-
nouncement and its effective date allows stakeholders to make
meaningful comments. These comments may allow an agency
to make improvements to its original rule, often by shedding
light on new information. Such changes may not only improve
the ultimate rule, but may also avoid future litigation. Second, a
delay allows stakeholders impacted by the change to make the
internal adjustments necessary to accommodate the change.
These rationales are particularly important in the case of the
APHIS Fee, which, unlike other user fees paid by airline passen-
gers, has no advisory committee. 1 2 An advisory committee com-
posed of stakeholders could have commented on proposed
changes during committee meetings before APHIS issued an in-
terim rule. Moreover, the committee's industry members would
have been on notice that their internal systems would soon re-
quire updates. In fact, impacted stakeholders had reason to be-
lieve that the APHIS Fee would not increase until after
September 30, 2010, because the last increase provided a fee
schedule valid until then.1 3 o
Airlines received three days' notice of the proposed fee hike.
Since the comment period lasted until November 27, 2009, al-
most two months after the increased fee's original effective date,
objections to the increase would not receive consideration until
long after airlines had collected thousands of dollars in in-
126 Id. at 49,315.
127 See, e.g., GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 22-23 (discussing stakeholder skep-
ticism fostered by a lack of information and communication regarding the fees).
128 See id.
129 See id. at 22.
1so See User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 71 Fed.
Reg. 49,984, 49,984 (Aug. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354).
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creased user fees.13 1 Determining after November 27, 2009, that
the fee increase was excessive would provide APHIS with a wind-
fall. This would not comport with the statutory language au-
thorizing the USDA to "prescribe and collect fees sufficient to
cover the cost of providing agricultural quarantine and inspection
services." 132 Airlines and travelers might seek refunds in court,
costing the USDA and taxpayers significant human and financial
resources. 3 3
Concerns over the proposed higher fee levels and rushed im-
plementation of the fee hikes without credible justification even-
tually caused the USDA to backtrack. On September 30, 2009,
just two days after the original Federal Register notice, APHIS
issued a press release announcing the suspension of the fee in-
creases until November 1, 2009.134 The new fees would still be-
come effective several weeks before public comments were
due."1 3  Finally, on October 30, 2009, APHIS withdrew its in-
terim rule. 1 3 6
APHIS took a similar approach with its prior fee increases.
On December 9, 2004, APHIS issued an interim rule that in-
cluded a fee hike effective January 1, 2005.137 Public comments
were due February 7, 2005, over a month after the effective
date.1 3' At least compared to the 2009 interim rule, the industry
was given almost a month-albeit during one of the busiest
travel periods-to prepare internal systems for the change. Nev-
ertheless, it was clear that public comments would not be con-
sidered before the implementation of the increase.
Likewise, on August 25, 2006, APHIS issued an interim rule
that would remove the exemption enjoyed by air passengers
originating in Canada. 13 9 Although the agency gave airlines two
131 User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 49,311.
132 See 21 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1) (2006) (emphasis added).
133 Airlines have frequently challenged APHIS in court. See, e.g., Cont'l Air-
lines, Inc. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 482, 484 (2007); Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 723, 727 (2005). "Passenger rights" advocates may
eventually show interest in litigating similar matters.
134 Press Release, supra note 119.
135 Id.
136 74 Fed. Reg. 57,057, 57,057 (Nov. 4, 2009).
137 User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,660, 71,660 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354).
138 Id.
139 User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 71 Fed. Reg.
50,320, 50,320 (Aug. 25, 2006) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354).
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months to submit comments, the interim rule noted that the
change would become effective November 24, 2006, the same
day that comments were due. 4 o As a result, it seemed unlikely
that APHIS intended to consider stakeholder input. In fact, of
the more than 150 public submissions during the notice-and-
comment period, APHIS never responded to any.14 1
This pattern of last-minute changes in fee schedules, with lit-
tle time for the industry to comment or make adjustments to
internal systems, is unacceptable. Even when the USDA allots
time for public comment, the agency seems less than sincere in
its desire to receive stakeholder feedback. The APHIS Fee ex-
ample presents another problem as well.
B. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FAILED To DEMONSTRATE A
NEED FOR THE CHANGES
In addition to the rushed nature of the latest APHIS interim
rule, APHIS made little effort to defend the increase. A lack of
rationalization goes against the spirit of a user fee. Whereas a
tax is a "mandatory assessment on an individual . . . based on
certain characteristics, such as income" and thus need not bear
any relationship to the services provided, a user fee differs.1 4 2 A
user fee is "imposed on individuals who use certain services pro-
vided by the government and is proportional to the use of the
service.""I
Although the distinction between a user fee and a tax is some-
times difficult to make, the statute authorizing the APHIS Fee
makes clear that the fee charged must be commensurate with
the services rendered. 1 4 4 The leading subsection of the statute
notes:
The Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe and collect fees suffi-
cient-(A) to cover the cost of providing agricultural quarantine
and inspection services in connection with the arrival at a port in
the customs territory of the United States, or the preclearance or
preinspection at a site outside the customs territory of the United
140 Id.
141 See Regulations.gov, Docket No. APHIS-2006-0096.
142 Gary Klott, Tax Watch; A 'UserFee': What's That?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1987, at
D2 (quoting John Pechman, then senior fellow at Brookings Institute); see also
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILIY OFFICE, GAO-05-734SP, GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN
THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCEss 94 (2005) [hereinafter GAO-05-734SP].
143 Klott, supra note 142; see also GAO-05-734SP, supra note 142, at 100.
-" See 21 U.S.C. § 136a(a)(1) (2006).
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States, of an international passenger .. .; [and] (B) to cover the
cost of administering this subsection . . ..1
While the "fees sufficient" language appears to set a minimum
level for user fees collected, the following section adds an upper
bound: "[T]he Secretary shall ensure that the amount of the
fees is commensurate with the costs of agricultural quarantine and
inspection services . . . ."14 Finally, although this language
seems to clearly indicate that the APHIS Fee must be directly
tied to the costs of APHIS inspections and administrative over-
head, the statute clears any remaining doubts by explaining how
the collected funds may be spent. "[F]unds in the . .. User Fee
Account shall be available ... to cover the costs associated with the
provision of agricultural quarantine and inspection services and
... administration." 1 4 7 The statute's three references to a direct
correlation between the amount charged to passengers and the
cost of performing APHIS inspections make clear that APHIS
must demonstrate increased costs before increasing user fees.
APHIS defended the most recent proposed fee increase with
three questionable rationales. First, the downturn in interna-
tional trade and travel has reduced fee collections.1 4 8 Second, it
would have been imprudent to furlough or fire existing APHIS
inspectors. 4 ' Third, the events of September 11, 2001, required
continued funding at the same level, regardless of fluctuations
in trade and travel volumes."o
The rationale that higher fees were needed because of the
lower number of passengers requiring screening is unconvinc-
ing. First and foremost, if a user fee were designed to cover the
APHIS inspections budget, fewer inspections should result in a
smaller budget. In fact, at the time of the proposed increase,
APHIS estimated a severe decline in inspections performed in
2009 compared with 2008.151 It projected 2.1 million fewer air
passengers requiring inspections.1 2 This dramatic projected
drop in traffic comported with industry estimates.'
145 Id.
14 Id. § 136a(a) (2) (emphasis added).
147 Id. § 136a(a) (5) (B) (emphasis added).
148 User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed. Reg.
49,311, 49,311 (Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354).
149 Id. at 49,311-12.
150 Id. at 49,311.
151 Id. at 49,313-14.
152 Id. at 49,314 (numbers rounded).
153 See, e.g., Ann Keeton, Air Industry Faces Grim Year Ahead, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 2009, at B3.
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On the other hand, although APHIS predicted that traffic in
2010 would "bounce back completely," leading industry analysts
disagreed with that contention." IATA, for example, predicted
that passenger numbers in 2010 would remain below 2007
levels.' Even if APHIS's assumption that air traffic would re-
bound proved correct, the cost of providing services to the same
number of people in 2010 as in 2008 should not lead to in-
creased costs. Instead, one could infer that the costs in 2010,
when adjusted for inflation, would mirror those in 2008. In-
creasing user fees should not become necessary until after traffic
exceeds pre-recession levels.
Moreover, this rationale contradicted the agency's rationale
for issuing an interim rule to increase the APHIS Fee in Decem-
ber 2004. At that time, APHIS explained that an increase was
required in order to recover the cost of "increased inspection ac-
tivity."' 6 Five years later, APHIS cited decreased inspection activ-
ity as similarly warranting a fee hike.61 5  These two competing
reasons cannot be reconciled. Accepting both would allow
APHIS to propose future user fee increases as long as traffic
volumes fluctuated; only in the event of stagnant numbers
would APHIS lack a rationale for increasing its fees.
Additionally, APHIS cited the "enhanced level of inspection
and related support services . . . since September 11, 2001," as a
reason for the changes. 5 8 APHIS had already cited increased
costs related to post-9/11 enhancements in its 2006 interim
rule.1 59 The 2009 interim rule failed to enumerate specific 9/
11-related changes that resulted in new expenses incurred since
2006.1"0 Absent such changes, merely referencing the tragedy of
9/11 should not result in unbounded freedom to increase user
fees.
154 User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed. Reg.
49,311, 49,314 (Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354).
15 INT'L AIR TRANSP. Ass'N, FINANCIAL FORECAST (Sept. 2009), available at
http://iata.org/whatwedo/economics/Documents/industry outlookSep09.pdf.
156 See User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71,660, 71,660 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 354) (emphasis
added).
157 User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 49,311.
158 Id.
159 See User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 71 Fed.
Reg. 49,984, 49,984 (Aug. 24, 2006).
16o See User Fees for Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection Services, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 49,311-12.
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Finally, APHIS preemptively attacked one argument against
an increase, noting, "We do not consider it advisable to cut back
on existing personnel as a cost-saving measure because of the
time required (two to three years) to train agricultural inspec-
tors." 6 ' This rationale fails in two important ways. First, retain-
ing employees based on the assumption that air traffic will
rebound quickly is wasteful. In response to the same collapse in
air travel, for example, airlines shed thousands of flight attend-
ant, pilot, and management positions.1 2 Second, the USDA
could also copy the airline industry by considering a system that
would allow for furloughs, rather than layoffs. Furloughed
APHIS inspectors could be recalled back to work as interna-
tional air traffic rebounds. This would mitigate the need to
train new inspectors. The airline industry frequently furloughs
pilots during periods of reduced travel, and then calls them
back as traffic returns.1 6 3 Like agricultural inspectors, pilots re-
quire significant training.1 6 4 Moreover, if needed, APHIS could
reduce the unnecessary components of inspectors' training, as
much of it is likely nonessential, or make more training on the
job rather than through formal instruction.1 6 1
The USDA's reasons for increasing the APHIS Fee simply did
not pass muster. Although the airline industry welcomed
APHIS's withdrawal of the interim rule,1 6 6 the two problems
cited with the latest fee increase proposal (failure to allow suffi-
cient time to receive and meaningfully respond to industry feed-
back and failure to demonstrate that fees remain commensurate
with costs) have plagued previous interim rules as well. They
161 Id. at 49,312.
162 See, e.g., Julie Johnsson, United to Trim More Flight Attendants, 600 Positions
Targeted, Carrier Seeks Volunteers to Take Unpaid Leaves, CHI. TIUB.,June 23, 2009, at
C19; Terry Maxon, American Shedding 921 Flight Attendant Positions, DALAS MOI-
INc NEws, Sept. 2, 2009, at ID; Dominic Walsh, BA to Cut Long-Haul Cabin Crew
Without Union Approval, THE TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 7, 2009, at 44.
163 See, e.g., Terry Maxon, American Won't Furlough Flight Attendants, to Recall
More Pilots, DALAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 29, 2009, at 5D.
16 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.127-29 (2010); 74 Fed. Reg. at 49,312.
165 When American Airlines faced a flight attendant strike in November 1993,
the Federal Aviation Administration reduced the required amount of cabin crew
training from nineteen days to just eight days. Terry Maxon, American Gets Waiver
to Cut Training Time If Attendants Strike, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 4, 1993, at
2D. Although an agricultural inspector's job may require more training than
that of a flight attendant, this example provides insight into the high percentage
of training in any industry that may be beneficial, yet nonessential. See id.
166 See Andrew Compart, US. Withdraws Fee Hike for Agricultural Inspections, for
Now, AviATION DAILY, Nov. 3, 2009, at 3.
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will no doubt persist in the future. A mechanism to harness the
ever-expanding cornucopia of APHIS and other fees must be
found.
IV. CONTROLLING TAXES AND FEES
Policy makers must find a method to control the current tax
and fee scheme for air transportation. Air travel helps to pro-
mote numerous public and economic policy goals.' It facili-
tates social cohesion as Americans can work, study, or retire
almost anywhere while still remaining able to easily visit relatives
and friends in other locations.' It maintains a flexible labor
market by facilitating the flow of immigrants and temporary mi-
grants into (and out of) the country, as well as the flow of Amer-
icans throughout the nation.1 6 9 And in addition to making
possible many types of trade in services, it is responsible for ship-
ping thirty to forty percent of world trade by value.1 70 If allowed
to rise unchecked, taxation of air transportation could eventu-
ally reach levels that would push passengers to stay home, thus
harming these and other desirable societal goals.
Moreover, commercial aviation has significantly and advanta-
geously impacted the economic development of numerous re-
gions.1 71 Long after the construction of a new terminal, runway,
or entire airport is completed-themselves temporary boons to
local economies-aviation continues to contribute positively to
local and regional economies.17 2 Aviation employs large num-
bers of people at various skill levels. This contributes greatly to
local employment rates, tax bases, and disposable incomes. In
addition, aviation stimulates economies by guaranteeing that
firms have convenient access to much-needed air service.173 Ma-
jor cities often possess airline hubs, thus providing nonstop
flights to the world's financial, industrial, and political capitals.
Secondary cities have the same access thanks to the hub-and-
spoke system that connects secondary cities (spokes) to major
cities (hubs) from which passengers can then connect almost
anywhere. Aviation often accelerates local economic growth or
167 BurrON, supra note 5, at i.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 7-9.
170 Id. at 7-8.
171 Id. at 9-10.
172 See id.
173 See id. at 9.
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makes it self-sustaining.1 7 4 For example, commercial aviation
has received much of the credit for the transformation of Flor-
ida from an agricultural economy to a diverse one with a robust
tourism sector.1 7 5 Aviation's ability to power local economies,
however, decreases as taxes make air travel less affordable.17 1
In order to ensure that aviation continues to further public
policy goals and to avoid negative downstream effects, policy
makers must implement a mechanism to control aviation taxes.
The GAO has provided one model: the unification of customs,
immigration, and APHIS user fees. In addition, portions of the
Chicago Convention and bilateral air service agreements should
be interpreted so as to constrain the taxes and fees that the
United States may levy on international air transportation.
A. UNIFICATION OF MOST FEES WOULD BENEFIT STAKEHOLDERS
In a 2007 report to several members of the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, the GAO found numerous faults with the current
structure of aviation user fees.1 77 These faults closely parallel
those found in the 2009 APHIS interim rule discussed above. In
particular, the GAO recommended that CBP, ICE, and APHIS
provide key information to stakeholders, form a single advisory
committee, consolidate reporting requirements, and eliminate
key differences between the three user fees.1 78 The implementa-
tion of these recommendations would effectively "harmonize"
the three existing user fees.
First and foremost, the GAO recommended that agencies in-
crease transparency and provide stakeholders with the informa-
tion necessary to fully evaluate the current user fees.17 ' Airlines,
in particular, complain that without knowledge of the staffing
levels of customs, immigration, and agricultural inspectors, it is
impossible to verify the agencies' cost estimates or to provide
meaningful feedback regarding fee adjustments.1 8 0 The agen-
cies have responded that such information is "law-enforcement
174 See id. at 9-10.
'7 See id. at 13.
176 See id. at 18.
177 GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 35 (the report did not consider the excise
tax, segment fees, and passenger facility charges levied on tickets).
17 See id. at 36.
179 See id.
Iso Id. at 24; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-321, FEDERAL
USER FEES: SUBSTANTIVE REVIEWS NEEDED TO ALIGN PORT-RELATED FEES WITH THE
PROGRAMS THEY SUPPORT 31 (2008) [hereinafter GAO-0&321].
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sensitive" and, if disclosed, would present a risk to homeland
security."' Even if staffing levels were sensitive, they could be
shared with designated airline employees who, having received
appropriate clearances, already represent their employers at ad-
visory committee meetings and participate in discussions regard-
ing other sensitive matters like the Federal Air Marshal
Program.
Moreover, now that customs, immigration, and agricultural
inspectors receive cross-training, the three types of inspectors
often conduct one another's duties.1 8 2 This complicates the
agencies' attempts to determine the exact cost of each type of
inspection and thereby how much of the fee to collect (in the
cases of ICE and CBP) or how much to charge users (in the case
of APHIS). In fact, GAO found that "neither CBP nor ICE know
whether the fees collected are recovering the full cost of immi-
gration inspection activities or whether the fees are properly di-
vided between them."1 8 3 If the agencies themselves cannot
make this determination, other stakeholders certainly lack the
ability to do so. A single, unified fee for all three services would
ease this problem. The total cost of the inspections could be
more readily divided by the number of passengers, thus estab-
lishing an estimate for an appropriate user fee. Since the three
inspections were themselves unified in 2003,184 unifying the user
fee is an appropriate next step.
Second, the GAO recommended that the fee-collecting agen-
cies collaborate when discussing fees with stakeholders."' Pres-
ently, advisory committees ensure a minimal level of stakeholder
feedback for the Customs User Fee and the Immigration and
Naturalization Fee.18 6 There is no equivalent committee for the
APHIS Fee."' Even in the two existing advisory committees,
ICE and APHIS do not participate, and airline participation is
muted due to the aforementioned lack of information and lack
of a mechanism that requires government agencies to share
information.'
181 GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 24.
182 See id. at 7-8.
183 Id. at 5.
184 See id. at 7-8.
185 Id. at 36.
186 See id. at 22-24.
187 See id.
-8 See id. at 23.
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Assuming its members can obtain key data, a single advisory
committee for all three user fees would most effectively address
the GAO's concern that stakeholders currently lack the means
necessary to contribute meaningfully to the user fee dialogue.
This would bring the fee-charging agencies and the impacted
industries to the same table on a regular basis. A single advisory
committee would also be best positioned to submit a unified re-
port to the eight congressional committees that oversee the fees.
Presently, the committees may be unaware of how fees work in
conflict or in concert with each other.18 9
Third, the GAO recommended that the agencies harmonize
their reporting requirements.o9 0 Even if the three fees remain
separate, airlines could report the same data for each fee, and
airlines could make transfers to the Federal Treasury at the
same time, it would be easier for stakeholders and agencies to
obtain "a comprehensive picture of the user fees supporting the
passenger inspection process.""'
Fourth, the GAO recommended the elimination of key differ-
ences in the applicability of the three user fees. 19 2 The three
fees apply differently to passengers arriving from Alaska, Hawaii,
Canada, Mexico, U.S. territories, and certain Caribbean is-
lands.' These differences complicate the oversight and audit
process.194
The implementation of the GAO recommendations would
streamline three of the user fees applied to air transportation.
Their implementation would lead to increased and better-in-
formed industry feedback. A more productive two-way dialogue
between agencies and stakeholders would not only increase mu-
tual trust but would exert more effective pressure to charge fees
that are presumably lower than or, at the least, commensurate
with the costs of the services provided. Even absent changes to
the other taxes and fees applied to airline tickets, harmoniza-
tion of these three user fees would reduce the ever-increasing
tax burden facing airline passengers-clearly a step in the right
direction.
189 Id. at 5.
190 Id. at 36.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 37.
193 Id. at 21.
194 Id. at 20.
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B. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION DOES NOT PROHIBIT AVIATION
FEES AND TAXES
The Chicago Convention fails to prohibit aviation taxes and
user fees."' Article 15 regulates "[a]irport and similar
charges."' The bulk of Article 15, however, addresses only im-
permissible price discrimination between national and foreign
carriers.19 ' The last sentence, however, provides further gui-
dance regarding charges that are not discriminatory. It notes,
"No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any con-
tracting State in respect solely of the right of . .. entry into or exit
from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons
... thereon.""' It is a well known-but publicly ignored-fact
that several foreign governments may violate this sentence by
charging air passengers a fee merely for the privilege of entering
or exiting the country. Chile, for example, charges an "Entry
Fee" of $131.1' While this fee is imposed in the guise of reci-
procity for the charge that Chilean citizens must pay in order to
obtain a U.S. visa interview, Chile imposes it upon entry without
issuing a visa or conducting an interview. 200 Argentina recently
began to levy a similar fee.20 1 It prudently called the charge an
"Entry Request Fee," thus implying that U.S. citizens are not pay-
ing merely for the privilege of entering the country, but instead
for the ability to request admission (analogous to a visa interview
fee).202
In the United States, however, the statutory bases for the vari-
ous charges detail a list of purposes beyond mere "entry or
exit."203 Fees collected pay for specific services such as infra-
structure improvements, aviation security, and border inspec-
195 Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 15, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
196 Id. art. 15.
197 See, e.g., Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S.A. v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230, 241-44 (D. Fla. 1961) (holding that a five percent
surcharge levied on certain Latin American airlines operating at Miami Interna-
tional Airport violated Article 15 of the Chicago Convention).
198 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 195, art. 15 (empha-
sis added).
199 Fast Facts About Traveling to Chile, EMBASSY OF CHILE IN WASHINGTON, D.C.,
http://www.chile-usa.org/fastfacts.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
200 Id.
201 Madhu Unnikrishnan, Argentina to Begin Charging Reciprocal Entry Tax, AvIA-
TION DAILY, Oct. 20, 2008, at 2.
202 Entry Request Fee, GOV'T OF ARG., http://www.argentina.gov.ar/argentina/
portal/paginas.dhtml?pagina=345 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
203 See supra, Part III.
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tions.2 0 4 The Chicago Convention does not require that user
fees paid by passengers satisfy any test of reasonableness or that
they be commensurate with the costs of the services provided."0
Thus, as long as each charge has a defined purpose, it is unlikely
to run afoul of the Convention. Even absent a clear statutory
purpose, a legal challenge under Article 15 could result in Con-
gress merely adding the requisite purpose to the authorizing
statute in order to avoid a court overturning the tax or fee.
C. SOME TAXES AND FEES MAY VIOLATE BILATERAL AIR
SERVICE AGREEMENTS
In addition, bilateral air service agreements serve as a check
on aviation fees and taxes. The U.S. Model Open Skies Agree-
ment devotes Article 10 to user charges, defined as "a charge
imposed on airlines for the provision of airport, airport environ-
mental, air navigation, or aviation security facilities or services
including related services and facilities."2 0 6 Although a strict
reading of that definition would not encompass taxes and fees
levied on individual passengers instead of airlines, a broader
reading could include them. Airlines are tasked with collecting
the taxes and fees from their passengers. 0 7 In addition, the stat-
utory purposes of the user fees and taxes closely align with those
enumerated in Article 10.
Within Article 10, section 1 requires that user charges be "just,
reasonable, not unjustly discriminatory, and equitably appor-
tioned among categories of users."20 s Section 2 requires that the
user charges "reflect, but shall not exceed, the full cost . . . of
providing the appropriate [services]. "209 The language of these
two sections comports with the language of the federal statutes
authorizing user charges that are "reasonably related to," "in
connection with," or "commensurate with" the services pro-
vided.2 1 0 Should the taxes and fees levied on air transportation
fail to comport with Article 10, international air carriers may ask
their home governments to seek consultations or dispute resolu-
204 Id.
205 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 195, art. 15.
206 U.S. Department of State, Model Open Skies Agreement art. I(11) (2008),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/I14970.pdf.
207 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 44940(e) (2006).
208 Model Open Skies Agreement, supra note 206, art. X(1).
20o Id. art. X(2).
210 49 U.S.C. § 44940(b) (the September 11th Security Fee); 19 U.S.C. § 58c(a)
(2006) (the Customs User Fee); 21 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2) (2006) (the APHIS Fee).
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tion under Articles 13 and 14 of the home country's bilateral
aviation agreement with the United States.
Section 3 of Article 10 requires that airlines be provided "such
information as may be necessary to permit an accurate review of
the reasonableness of the charges."211 This comports with the
rationales behind the Customs User Fee and Immigration and
Naturalization Fee advisory committees.21 2 GAO reports have
raised several questions regarding the lack of information pro-
vided to stakeholders on these two committees, as well as con-
cerns over the lack of any sort of formal dialogue between
APHIS and its stakeholders?.2 1  Airlines currently pay a per-air-
craft APHIS Fee, which certainly qualifies as a "user charge" as
defined by the Model Open Skies Agreement. 214 Based on the
GAO findings, however, airlines may lack "such information ...
necessary to permit an accurate review of the reasonableness of
the [APHIS Fee]."215 Moreover, some stakeholders have as-
serted that user fee increases may qualify as "significant regula-
tory actions" subject to a 1993 Executive Order requiring
agencies to conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.2 1 6 As
a result, the home states of international air carriers may have
good cause to seek remedies under Articles 13 and 14 of their
home countries' bilateral aviation agreements with the United
States.
Articles 13 and 14 provide two mechanisms for resolving dis-
putes that arise under an air service rights agreement.217 The
first allows one country-party to request consultations with an-
other country-party, who must agree to begin consultations
within sixty days.2 18 If thirty days of consultations fail to produce
a solution, a party may invoke the second dispute resolution
mechanism: referring the matter to a decision-making body or
to arbitration.219
It should be noted, however, that dispute resolution under air
service agreements has had mixed results. In one recent case
211 Model Open Skies Agreement, supra note 206, art. X(3).
212 See GAO-07-1131, supra note 98, at 22 n.27.
213 See id. at 22; GAO-08-321, supra note 180, at 31.
214 7 C.F.R. § 354.3(e) (2010).
215 Model Open Skies Agreement, supra note 206, art. X.
216 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
217 Model Open Skies Agreement, supra note 206, arts. XIII-XIV.
218 Id. art. XIII.
219 Id. art. XIV. The second stage of dispute resolution is governed by the In-
ternational Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41310
(2006).
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involving Brazil, more fully described below, a veiled threat by
U.S. carriers to ask Washington to request consultations with
Brasilia resulted in a favorable change of Brazilian law.2 2 0 On
the other hand, in a recent case involving Argentina, also de-
scribed below, consultations and later litigation failed to pro-
duce a change in the suspect Argentine law.22 1
In 2002, the Brazilian government began to apply a tax known
as PIS/COFINS to jet fuel used by U.S. carriers on flights from
Brazil to the United States. 2 2 2 The U.S.-Brazil air service agree-
ment, however, provided for a mutual exemption from fuel
taxes for the airlines of both states.2 23 The Air Transport Associ-
ation (ATA), representing U.S. airlines accounting for more
than 90% of all U.S. passenger and cargo traffic, sent a letter to
Brazil's Ministry of Finance that noted the apparent violation of
the air service agreement. 2 24 ATA copied the Office of Aviation
Negotiations at the U.S. State Department, the Office of Inter-
national Aviation at the U.S. DOT, the Office of Service Indus-
tries at the U.S. Department of Commerce, as well as U.S.
Ambassador Clifford Sobel, all of whom would have ultimately
played a role in resolving the dispute.2 2 5 Within a year, without
the U.S. airlines' having to request formal consultations, the
Brazilian government amended its civil code to eliminate the
PIS/COFINS tax on jet fuel, saving international air carriers
$100 million annually.2
On the other hand, Brazil's neighbor showed less interest in
fulfilling its bilateral air service agreement obligations, even af-
ter formal consultations and subsequent litigation. In 2002, Ar-
gentina ended its peso's peg to the U.S. dollar, effectively
devaluing the Argentine currency to thirty-three U.S. cents.2 2 7
To mitigate the impact on the public-most of whom had lost
220 Press Release, IATA, Strengthening the Foundations of Brazilian Aviation
(Aug. 20, 2009), available at http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/pages/2009-08-
20-01.aspx.
221 See generally Aerolineas Argentinas S.A. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 415 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
222 Decreto No. 4.524 (Titulo IV, Capitulo I, Segro I) de 17 de Dezembro de
2002, DIAluo OFFICIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 18.12.2002 (Brazil).
225 Agreement between Brazil and the United States of America on Air Trans-
port art. IX(1)(b), U.S.-Braz., Mar. 21, 1989, T.I.A.S. 11780.
224 Letter from David Berg, General Counsel, ATA, to Guido Mantega, Finance
Minister of Brazil (Aug. 14, 2008) (on file with author).
225 [d.
226 Press Release, IATA, supra note 220.




two-thirds of their wealth overnight when their bank accounts
were converted from U.S. dollars into Argentine pesos-the Ar-
gentine Congress passed legislation requiring payment of gov-
ernment taxes and fees at the old one-to-one exchange rate.2 2 8
Thus, airlines paying user fees and taxes continued to pay the
same amounts. 2 President Eduardo Duhalde, however, soon
issued an Executive Decree that required all fees levied on air-
lines at Buenos Aires Ministro Pistarini de Ezeiza International
Airport (Ezeiza) be paid in dollars at the new three-to-one ex-
change rate.2 3 0 With little warning, airlines' bills increased
threefold. 3
Several air carriers challenged the Executive Decree's consti-
tutionality.232 Only one carrier, Aerolineas Argentinas (Aerolin-
eas), secured an injunction against the enforcement of the
Executive Decree, thus allowing it to pay airport charges at the
old one-to-one rate.2 3 3 The other airlines to challenge the fee,
all foreign carriers, were denied the same relief.234 As a result,
beginning in September 2002, an Argentine airline began pay-
ing one-third of the fees paid by foreign carriers for the same
airport services.235 DOT found this policy to unfairly discrimi-
nate against U.S. carriers in violation of the Air Transport Ser-
vices Agreement between the Governments of the United States
of America and the Republic of Argentina.2 36 As a result, DOT
began requiring that Aerolineas pay into an escrow account in
the United States the difference between the fees it paid for
flights from Ezeiza to the United States and those paid by its
U.S. competitors.2 3 ' Failure to pay would require the cessation
of Aerolineas service to the United States. 2 3 8 Aerolineas ulti-











237 Id. at 3-4.
23 Roy Goldberg, Airline Challenges to Airport Abuses of Economic Power, 72 J. AIR
L. & COM. 351, 359 (2007).
239 Aerolineas Argentinas, 415 F.3d at 7.
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Despite both administrative and judicial determinations that
the government of Argentina has violated its air service agree-
ment with the United States, the discriminatory fee schedule re-
mains in place. Aerolineas continues to make payments into an
escrow account.240 As of October 2010, when Aerolineas made
its 339th deposit, the escrow account contained U.S.
$9,144,976.01.241 Given that the airline's former Spanish owner,
Grupo Marsans S.A., valued the company at between U.S. $250
million and $400 million during Argentina's 2008 nationaliza-
tion of the company, the escrow account is not small change.2 4 2
The difference in the outcomes of the Brazilian and Argen-
tine disputes demonstrates that the requirements set out in Arti-
cle 10 of bilateral air service agreements may be difficult to
enforce. Just as the United States sometimes has difficulty secur-
ing the compliance of foreign countries, so too might foreign
countries have difficulty persuading the U.S. government to al-
ter its aviation tax and user fee structure. The State Department
and DOT may not wish to devote their finite resources to the
matter. On the other hand, certain countries could use threats
of requesting consultations over taxes and user fees as a bargain-
ing chip in future bilateral negotiations. There is no reason why
a country could not invoke the arbitration provision and put the
United States to the test over whether aviation fees are consis-
tent with Article 10. Countries as diverse as China, Colombia,
Israel, and South Africa, to name a few, retain restrictive aviation
agreements with the United States. The U.S. government may
make changes to the current tax and user fee schemes in order
to reach Open Skies agreements with those countries and
others.
V. CONCLUSION
According to a report by the National Commission to Ensure
a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, "The air transportation
system has become essential to economic progress for the citi-
zens and businesses of the nation. "243 Airline tickets long ago
ceased to be luxury goods. As a result, the government must
24 E-mail from John Romans, Counsel for Aerolineas Argentinas S.A., to Carl
Nelson, Counsel for American Airlines, Inc., et al. (Oct. 5, 2010, 17:57 EST),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/ (find Doc. No. DOT-OST-2003-15092.
241 Id.
242 Taos Turner, Airline Grab Gains Ground in Argentina, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20,
2008, at A10.
243 BurrON, supra note 5, at 9.
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ensure that taxation of air transportation does not reach the
"tipping point," where it begins to negatively impact bookings
and thus the greater economy. With nine charges totaling
upwards of $75 currently levied by Washington and even more
taxes adding up to $350 levied by foreign governments on inter-
national itineraries, the tipping point may be very near, if it has
not already been reached. The 2009 APHIS Fee interim rule
serves as an example of how the system has gone awry. To avoid
negatively impacting air travel, the U.S. government should
streamline the current scheme by implementing GAO recom-
mendations and remaining very wary of possible infractions of
the Chicago Convention and bilateral air service rights
agreements.
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APPENDIX: Table of Aviation Taxes and Fees2 4 4
TABLE 1
[ 75
Name Applicability Exceptions Amount
Passenger Facility Departing passengers Collected by only $1.00 - $4.50
Charge the first two airports






Excise Tax Domestic flights 7.5% of ticket price
Flights to/from cities
within 225 miles of
the U.S. border
Federal Segment Fee Domestic segments $3.70 per segment
within the Continen-
tal United States
Travel Facilities Tax Domestic segments $8.10 per segment
from Alaska or
Hawaii
International Trans- International jour- $16.10 per trip
portation Tax neys to/from the
United States
September 11th Domestic segments $2.50 - $5.00 per
Security Fee one-way trip
Customs User Fee International arrivals Passengers arriving $5.50 per passenger
to the United States from Canada, Mex-
ico, and the Carib-
bean are exempt
Immigration and International arrivals Passengers who do $7.00 per passenger
Naturalization Fee to the United States not receive an
inspection are
exempt
Animal and Plant International arrivals Passengers traveling $5.00 per passenger
Health Inspection to the United States between the U.S.
Service Fee Virgin Islands and





24 The following information is compiled from the sources discussed above.
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